This paper studies banks' incentives regarding the timing of payment submissions in a collateral-based RTGS payment system and how these incentives change with the introduction of a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM). We show that an LSM allows banks to economise on collateral while also providing...

Using the model of Rochet and Vives (2004), this note shows that a prudential regulator can in general not mitigate a bank’s failure risk solely by means of liquidity requirements. However, their effectiveness can be restored if, in addition, minimum capital requirements are met. This provides...

We identify frictions in the market for liquidity as well as bank-specific and market-wide factors that affect the prices that banks pay for liquidity, captured here by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap. We have price data at the...

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the interbank market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves...