This note provides axiomatizations of the discounting utilitarian rule and the Rawlsian infimum rule for an infinite setting. Contrary to the finite case, an objective function cannot at the same time satisfy anonymity and the strong Pareto principle. The Rawlsian rule is based on anonymity, and...

An important problem faced by colleges and universities, that of evaluating the effect of their financial aid offers on student enrollment decisions, is complicated by the likely endogeneity of the aid offer variable in a student enrollment equation. This article shows how discontinuities in an...

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

We study divisor methods, the primary class to solve apportionment problems, based upon Stolarsky means Saß. These encompass the five traditional methods. We disclose a one-to-one relation between methods of the form Sa1 and aggregate measures of seat/vote disproportionality of the generalized...

Different social planners may have different opinions on the well-being of individuals under different social options (Roberts, 1980). If utilities are translation- or ratio-scale measurable, or if the social ranking might be incomplete, or if interplanner comparability is allowed; then there...

The extended rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare order introduced and axiomatized by Stéphane Zuber and Geir B. Asheim satisfies strong anonymity (J. Econ. Theory (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.08.001). We question the appropriateness of strong anonymity in the context of a countably...