It is commonly believed that an increase in environmental awareness is conducive to the protection of the global commons. Moreover, it has been proposed that governments should "give a good example" by unilaterally reducing emissions. In a simple analytical framework it is shown that these...

We investigate the incentives of environmental liability law to improve pollution control technology. It is shown that equilibrium choice of abatement technology and of the level of pollution reduction is socially optimal under very restrictive conditions. However, technological spillovers...

Review of: Effiziente Verhaltenssteuerung und Kooperation im Zivilrecht. Ed. by Claus Ott, Hans-Bernd Schäfer. 1997. Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen

This paper analyzes equilibrium R&D in pollution control and equilibrium pollution abatement by polluters who are subject to environmental liability law when the level of compensation differs from the level of environmental harm. We contrast the performance of strict liability with that of the...