In a costly state verification model under commitment the principal may acquire a costly public and imperfectly revealing signal before or after contracting. If the project remains profitable after all signal realisations, optimally the signal is collected, if at all, after contracting, and it...

Within a costly state verification setting, we derive the optimal financial contract between an entrepreneur, a (potentially financing) supervisor and a pure investor when there is non-verifiable and non-contractible monitoring and limited liability. We show that diversion of cash flows to the...

Recent literature has considered the form of loan contract between two or more risk neutral parties where the revelation principle is inappropriate due to the lack of commitment to an auditing policy by the lender. The privately informed debtor has a stochastic return; once he knows the state...

The paper examines the ways in which citizens negotiate responsibility in relation to various environmental and technological risks. It focuses on the role of agency and the way that this figures in constructions of <i>relations of responsibility</i> between individuals and institutions. A central...