We put forth a general theory of boundedly rational behavior and learning for symmetric normal-form games with unique symmetric Nash equilibria. A class of evidence-based behavioral rules is specified, which includes best-responding to a prior and Nash play. A player begins with initial...

First and second price auctions are optimal mechanisms for resource allocation in many situations and are used widely. However, unlike the static once-and-for-all situations for which auctions are efficient, in dynamic stochastic environments auctions cannot necessarily support opimal...

Experimental data have consistently shown diversity in beliefs as well as in actions among experimental subjects. This paper presents and compares alternative behavioral econometric models for the characterization of player heterogeneity, both between and within subpopulations of players. In...

Rule learning posits that decision makers, rather than choosing over actions, choose over behavioral rules with different levels of sophistication. Rules are reinforced over time based on their historically observed payoffs in a given game. Past works on rule learning have shown that when...

Since Thaler (1981), we have lived with the uncomfortable stylized fact that many humans choose strictly dominated actions in intertemporal choice experiments. We designed an experiment to probe the reasons for the apparently suboptimal behavior, and we find that the classic Fisher (1930)...

The evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences, natural sciences (especially biology), and even computer science. It has long been recognized that the possibility of future consequences is crucial to the emergence of rational cooperation. It was...

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