Merchant fees and reward programs generate an implicit monetary transfer to credit card users from non-card (or "cash") users because merchants generally do not set differential prices for card users to recoup the costs of fees and rewards. On average, each cash-using household pays $149 to...

We analyze the impact of interchange fees on consumers' and merchants' incentives to adopt an innovative payment instrument, in a setting where there are adoption externalities between consumers and merchants. We show that consumer adoption decreases with the interchange fee for high degrees of...

Despite the growing importance of the debit card in most developed countries, there are relatively few academic studies that analyze the impact of such evolution on the demand for cash. Beyond data availability, this research is complicated by the fact that the debit card provides two services...

It takes many years for more efficient electronic payments to be widely used, and the fees thatmerchants (consumers) pay for using those services are increasing (decreasing) over time. Weaddress these puzzles by studying payments system evolution with a dynamic model in a twosidedmarket setting....

This paper analyzes the juridical nature of the relationships formed due to the issuance and use of payment cards. It focuses on the issue of countermanding a payment given by using a payment card (stop payment order)

It takes many years for more efficient electronic payments to be widely used, and the fees that merchants (consumers) pay for using those services are increasing (decreasing) over time. We address these puzzles by studying payments system evolution with a dynamic model in a two-sided market...