We investigate the concomitance of intermittent wind powered generation (WPG) with load to assess its system value as the cost of replacing its output, hour by hour, using more intensively thermal technologies. The difference with its actual cost defines a social cost of wind power which is...

We consider the following stage game : a domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different...

Both product differentiation through quality and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition. However, they have not been considered simultaneously. To this end we consider a three stage game where firms choose quality then commit to capacity and finally compete in price. We...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman [83] in the address model of horizontal differentiation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competition drastically. In...

We propose a model where employers have two types of prejudices: racial and spatial discriminations. Because of the rst one, black workers have less chance than white workers to nd a job. Because of the second one, workers living closer to the city-center have less chances than suburban workers...

This paper analyses the interaction between comparative advantages, social protection and the political system. Considering entirely symmetrical countries whose production factors are immobile, we suggest that redistributive policies can be "exported” or "imported" depending on their impact on...

Williamson (1979) claims that in a buyer-seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and state of nature, the hold up of future benefits leads to underinvestment. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) resolve it provided that the initial contract can specify a default option...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of hor- izontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna [89]. We show that a foreign pro- ducer would...

We study the efficiency of the equilibrium price in a centralized, orderdriven market where many asymmetrically informed traders are active for many periods. We show that asymmetries of information can lead to suboptimal information revelation with respect to the symmetric case. In particular,...