We study duopoly competition between a domestic and a foreign firm who first choose their quality and then compete in prices in the domestic market. As is well known, the free-trade equilibrium exhibits quality differentiation and indeterminacy of the quality leader. We show that an import quota...

Using the Transfermarkt database, we compute the career market value of most profes- sional male football players from the top 50 countries. Aggregating, we obtain for each country the approximate market value generated in this century as well as the per-capita value gener- ation, a proxy for...

San Martín and Saracho (2010) show that an incumbent, in a duopoly, prefers licensing an innovation through ad-valorem rather than per-unit royalties. In this note, we consider an outsider and oligopoly. We show that an outsider innovator prefers ad-valorem royalties. For an oligopoly that is...

We study the prevalence of forest fires in Spain in the long run by computing the probability that a forest tree, as opposed to shrub or bush, will be lost to fire over one year. We first show that climate change increases the likelihood of this event. Next, we document how risk grew...

In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model in which products are differentiated â€à la Hotellingâ€. We assumine that only one of the two firms faces a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of the unconstrained firm for the...

We consider a stage-game where the entrant may simultaneously commit to its product's quality and the level of its production capacity before price competition takes place. We show that capacity limitation is more effective than quality reduction as a way to induce entry accommodation: the...

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, or capacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a "Minimum Quality Standard" in order to help the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to the...

The welfare impact of a merger involves the market power offense and the efficiency defense. Salant et al. (1983) show that mergers among symmetric firms are unprofitable except for monopolization. We characterize the limit to this merger paradox in a simple linear Cournot oligopoly with...