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On competing rewards standards : an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining
Genîzî, Ûrî; Guth, Werner - In: The journal of socio-economics 31 (2002) 6, pp. 599-607
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001764307
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The predominant role of signal precision in experimental beauty contests
Baeriswyl, Romain; Cornand, Camille - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 16 (2016) 1, pp. 267-301
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431364
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[Rezension von: Ryll, W., Litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information]
Güth, Werner - In: Journal of economics 65 (1997) 2, pp. 232-233
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001348943
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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - In: Review of economic design : RED 19 (2015) 3, pp. 173-209
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409065
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Symmetry in bargaining and efficient contracts under asymmetric information
Sen, Arijit - In: Studies in microeconomics 5 (2017) 2, pp. 132-142
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012023835
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Telling the other what one knows? : strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
Angelovski, Andrej; Di Cagno, Daniela; Güth, Werner; … - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 88 (2020) 1, pp. 97-119
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237042
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The adverse effects of renegotiation in procurement auctions with endogenous liability
Chang, Wei-Shiun - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 81 (2019), pp. 91-101
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012242031
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A theory of bargaining deadlock
Hwang, Ilwoo - In: Games and economic behavior 109 (2018), pp. 501-522
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173238
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Settlement under the threat of conflict : the cost of asymmetric information
Sjöberg, Eric - 2014
I study a situation where two players disagree on the division of a good. In the first of two stages, the players can divide the good peacefully between them by signing a contract. If either or both players reject the contract, they must engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337007