This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal" stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to" lengthen the more credible the program, the lower the long-term interest rate and the higher the" volatility of...

This Paper provides evidence on the behaviour of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations. Such episodes provide valuable information on the way debt instruments are chosen because they allow the problem of policymakers' expectations of interest rates not generally being observable to...

This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility...

This paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations. Such episodes provide valuable information on the way debt instruments are chosen because they allow to overcome the problem that policymakers' expectations of interest rates are generally not...

This paper examines public debt management during episodes of fiscal stabilization when long-term interest rates are generally higher than governments' expectations of future rates. We find that governments increase the share of fixed-rate long-term debt denominated in the domestic currency, the...