This dissertation is composed of three independent essays in economic theory. In the first essay, a pure exchange model where households face liquidity constraints because of the incomplete nature of the financial system is analyzed. Some properties of the equilibrium correspondence which maps...

We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement. All players have the same utility function of the form $\delta s$ where $s$ is the share of a player and $\delta$ the discount factor. We present four simple bargaining processes where a player's...

This thesis contains three essays in which the formation of coalitions affects players' bargaining power in input markets. The first essay considers two independent bilateral monopoly markets. It shows that integrating two players on the same side of these independent bilateral monopoly markets...

We analyze a bargaining game where an anchor player bargains sequentially with n non-anchor players over the division of a pie in the presence of third-party transfers and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium. In the case where third-party transfers are lump-sum, the transfers are...