We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...

We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem-solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal...

We investigate dynamic coordination among members of a problem-solving team who receive private signals about which of their actions are required for a (static) coordinated solution and who have repeated opportunities to explore different action combinations. In this environment ordinal...

We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider...