This paper studies a mechanism design model of financial intermediation. There are two informational frictions: agents receive unobservable shocks and can participate in markets by engaging in trades unobservable to intermediaries. Without regulations, intermediaries provide no risk sharing...

This paper derives the optimal lending contract in the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG). The optimal contract includes indexation to the aggregate return on capital, household consumption, and the return to internal funds. This triple indexation results in a...

This paper derives the optimal lending contract in the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), hereafter BGG. The optimal contract includes indexation to the aggregate return on capital, household consumption, and the return to internal funds. This triple...

This paper studies a mechanism design model of financial intermediation. There are two informational frictions: agents receive unobservable shocks and can participate in markets by engaging in trades unobservable to intermediaries. Without regulations, intermediaries provide no risk sharing...

This paper addresses the positive and normative implications of indexing risky debt to observable aggregate conditions. These issues are pursued within the context of the celebrated financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The principal conclusions are that the...