In an international setting, sovereignty of countries imposes serious problems on compliance and participation for a multilateral environmental agreement. This paper discusses both problems simultaneously in a three-country-setting. It employs a repeated-game-model and develops some basic...

This paper characterizes the wage setting behavior in a totally unionized economy under different monetary policy rules. The wage formation strategy of the union can be either aggressive or cooperative.. As long as the union is fully cooperative and in the absence of shocks, the government can...

Trade between Eastern and Western Europe has increased considerably in the last years. Given this market-induced development, why should it be necessary to advance institutional integration? This paper argues that Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) can potentially enhance the...

This paper is no more than a critical note on the mismatch philosophy. Its main point is that, under empirically acceptable assumptions, all measures developed so far - and probably all measures likely to emerge from refining the mismatch tools - are bound to seriously underestimate the extent...

A theoretical model is developed to describe the behavior of dependent and independent central banks. In an empirical test, the reaction functions of six central banks of industrial countries with different degrees of independence are estimated using an error correction framework. In shock...

This article investigates efficient policies against global warming in the case of multiple greenhouse gases. In a dynamic optimization model conditions for an efficient combination of greenhouse gases are derived. The model is empirically specified and adapted to a simulation approach. By...

Mit diesem theoretischen Überblick wird die These vertreten, daß sowohl die Methode als auch die Organisation der Privatisierung aus polit-ökonomischen Erwägungen von den jeweiligen Politikern ausgewählt bzw. strukturiert wird, und nicht aus transaktionskostenökonomischen oder...