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The choice of acquiring medical information in life insurance markets

Sulganik, Eyal; Zilcha, Itzhak - In: The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the … 66 (1999) 4, pp. 609-620

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001485822

Sequential aggregation of verifiable information

Hahn, Volker - 2010 - This version: September 2010

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by … career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold … phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008748176

Expert analysis and insider information in horserace betting : regulating informed market behavior

Peirson, John (contributor); Smith, Michael A. (contributor) - 2008

We present a new model analyzing the effect of uncertainty faced by bookmakers. It is shown that bettors with inside information or expert analysis decrease the odds set by profit maximizing bookmakers. Data on previously unraced two year old horses and those that have raced previously are used...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003784959

Expert analysis and insider information in horse race betting : regulating informed market behavior

Peirson, John; Smith, Michael A. - In: Southern economic journal 76 (2010) 4, pp. 976-992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008701389

The organization of expertise in the presence of communication

Roldán, Flavia - In: Review of economic design : RED 17 (2013) 1, pp. 63-81

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720918

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436207

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436518

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010461860

Monitoring experts

Azrieli, Yaron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1313-1350

We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision … on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to "monitor each other" by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806483

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