We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price.

This paper examines coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) of a mixed duopoly with price competition where the public firm meets all the demand coming to it. If the private firm is free to supply less than demand, then the unique CPNE involves the competitive price. If however the private firm...

This paper contributes to the debate on the implication of market integration in fostering innovations. In contrast to the literature, we use a model of vertical product differentiation and formalize the speed of response to market integration as a first mover advantage in R&D. If the domestic...

Transferring land from (relatively low productivity) agriculture to industry has proved to be difficult in many less developed countries. This is the first paper to document the role of legislated ceiling size in explaining this puzzle, arguing that these legislations made land acquisition for...