Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the R&D investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments potentially confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm has private information both about its efficiency and about spillovers. It is shown that strategic...

With internationally mobile labour and the abolition of national border controls, the individual may not only have private information about his skill level (adverse selection), but also about the length of time he resides and works in the home country (moral hazard) and about his foreign...

Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in...

A multinational enterprise is subject to taxation by two jurisdictions who compete to capture its rents, while being aware that the firm also has investment options outside these jurisdictions. The firm has private informatio about its efficiency. We show that a higher outside option for the...