This paper examines the decision to exercise employee stock options (ESOs). Our results indicate a positive relation between the extent of quot;earlyquot; exercise and the unhedged risk of the option. Specifically we document a positive relation between the variance of ESO returns and the extent...

The theoretical prediction of a negative coefficient on positively correlated peer performance underlies much of the empirical literature on relative performance evaluation. This prediction is commonly obtained from the special case of a single period setting where the variance-covariance matrix...

This paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role (in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's expected...

This paper examines the decision to exercise employee stock options (ESOs). Our results indicate a positive relation between the extent of quot;earlyquot; exercise and the unhedged risk of the option. Specifically we document a positive relation between the variance of ESO returns and the extent...

In this paper, we study a setting where a firm (principal) is privately informed of the firm's potential and contracts with an agent to supply unobservable effort. We show it can be optimal for the firm to have loose monitoring in the sense that the monitoring system is less perfect than what is...

This paper studies the role of observable accounting biases in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We regard accounting numbers as serving two important roles: the valuation role in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's...

We examine the manner and extent to which firms evaluate performance relative to aspirational peer firms. Guided by the predictions of an agency model, we find that CEO compensation increases in the correlation between own and aspirational peer firm performances. In addition, we define and test...