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A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; … - In: Annals of economics and finance 1 (2000) 2, pp. 231-263
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001731843
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A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine - 2008
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771161
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Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-Blowing : A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
Chassang, Sylvain - 2014
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050290
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Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing : A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
Chassang, Sylvain - 2015
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033647
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The Political Economy of Indirect Control
Padró i Miquel, Gerard - 2010
This paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its … to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147577
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The political economy of indirect control
Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Yared, Pierre - In: The quarterly journal of economics 127 (2012) 2, pp. 947-1015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544346
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The Political Economy of Indirect Control
Miquel, Gerard Padró i - 2010
This paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its … to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462907
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Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing : a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
Chassang, Sylvain - 2014
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458351
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Ideal point estimation in political hierarchies : a framework and an application to the US executive branch
Acs, Alex - In: The journal of law, economics, and organization 36 (2020) 1, pp. 207-230
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012171128
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The Political Economy of Indirect Control
Padró i Miquel, Gerard; Yared, Pierre - 2012
This paper characterizes optimal policy when a government uses indirect control to exert its authority. We develop a … standard repeated moral hazard model with two additional features. First, the principal is allowed to exert direct control by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040910