This study shows the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the model of multiple voluntarily supplied public goods with potential contributors possessing different Cobb-Douglas preferences. This study provides a sufficient condition for uniqueness using graph theory. This sufficient condition allows...

This paper investigates how the presence of social capital affects the externality arising from status-seeking preference as a parable for inefficient antagonistic behavior. It is assumed that the stock of social capital is accumulating through joint social interaction between rational...

This paper investigates how the heterogenous incomes and preferences of potential donors affect the timing of contribution decisions when it is endogenously determined by contributors themselves. More specifically, we use a simple setting with two donors, Cobb-Douglas preferences, and complete...

We introduce distributive justice into a simple model of growth and distribution. Two groups ("classes") of otherwise identical, capital-rich and capital-poor individuals ("capitalists") and ("workers") are in conflict over factor (labour-capital) shares. Capitalists' (workers') ideal labour...

Traditional economic models of vaccination behavior simply assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decisions of others. We provide three different models of private provision of a public good, such as a joint production model and a conjectural variation model, to explain how a positive...