The empirical evidence presented in this paper casts serious doubts on the by now widely accepted "stylized factes" of the exchange rate based stabilization programs (ERBS) as they are stated in Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) and in vegh (1992).

This paper formalizes the relation between comparative statics and the out-of-equilibrium explanation for how a system evolves after a change in parameters.

We fully characterize the preferences relations that can be represented by a utility. Representation is equivalent to the condition that preferences do not have too many "jumps". A characterization of preferences that can be represented by a continuous utility follows trivially from our...

We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching ? in the set...

We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an...

We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications for observable demand behavior (its testable implications), and for the consumer's underlying preferences. We characterize...

Abstract We study when two-member household choice behavior is compatible with Pareto optimality. We ask when an external observer of household choices, who does not know the individuals' preferences, can rationalize the choices as being Pareto-optimal. Our main contribution is to reduce the...