distributed between inventors and investors. As a result, bank lending for firm R&D has been rare. However, firms can signal the … potential to alter the risk assessment of the firm’s main bank. Additionally, we explore heterogeneities in these risk … assessments arising from the industry level and the main bank’s portfolio. We test our theoretical predictions for a sample of …

distributed between inventors and investors. As a result, bank lending for firm R&D has been rare. However, firms can signal the … potential to alter the risk assessment of the firm’s main bank. Additionally, we explore heterogeneities in these risk … assessments arising from the industry level and the main bank’s portfolio. We test our theoretical predictions for a sample of …

are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and … collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank … competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition …

are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and … collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank … competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition …