This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information. The framework explicitly accounts for the parties’ individual trade actions. The sets of implementable...

This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaining solution and individual...

We study two-person, multiple-issue bargaining problems and identify four procedures by which the bargaining may take place. Drawing on some logic from non-cooperative game theory, we propose axioms which relate the outcomes of the procedures. We also promote a weak monotonicity axiom on...

This paper considers propagation of aggregate shocks in a dynamic general-equilibrium model with labor-market matching and endogenous job destruction. Cyclical fluctuations in the job-destruction rate magnify the output effects of shocks, as well as making them much more persistent. Interactions...