Informed by Grether and Plott (1979) and Cox and Grether (1996), we implement various preference elicitation procedures over a parameter grid. First, we find a lower incidence of preference reversals for probability equivalents from the dual-to-selling version of Becker, Degroot, and Marschak (1964;...

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This paper estimates individual risk preferences based upon data that are generated by the same individuals acting in different institutions. The results show that the (estimated) numerical values of individuals' implied risk parameters are not stable within individuals across institutions....

In this paper we explore the performance of Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) in two different auction institutions: First Price Sealed Bid, and Becker-DeGroot-Marschak. Our results suggest that learning has some promise as a possible explanation for previously documented cross- institutional...

This paper reports new data from both selling and buying versions of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure. First, when using the selling version of BDM, the cross-sectional mean of CRRA risk preference parameter estimates shifts from a value consistent with “as if†risk-seeking...

Goods are said to be combinatorial when the value of a bundle of goods is not equal to the sum of the values of the same goods unbundled. Investigations of combinatorial allocation problems should recognize that there are two separate aspects of such problems: an environmental distinction...

Centipede games and Dutch auctions provide important instances in which game theory fails empirically. The reasons for these empirical failures are not well understood. Standard centipede games and Dutch auctions differ from each other in terms of their Institutional Format (IF), Dynamic...