Similar Search Results

An experiment on learning with limited information : nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow

Friedman, Eric; Shor, Mikhael; Shenker, Scott; Sopher, Barry - In: Games and economic behavior 47 (2004) 2, pp. 325-352

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002024733

Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships

Cripps, Martin (contributor); Mailath, George J. (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001950011

Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

Nachbar, John Haines - In: Social choice and welfare 18 (2001) 2, pp. 303-326

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001571463

An experiment on learning with limited information : nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow

Friedman, Eric (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001547477

The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side

Mertens, Jean-François - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 27 (1998) 3, pp. 343-357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001436974

Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information : the general symmetric case

Neyman, Abraham; Sorin, Sylvain - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 27 (1998) 2, pp. 201-210

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001437370

Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information

Sorin, Sylvain - In: Games and economic behavior 29 (1999) 1/2, pp. 274-308

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001443098

An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Anderhub, Vital; Engelmann, Dirk; Güth, Werner - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001473116

Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games

Cripps, Martin - In: Games and economic behavior 18 (1997) 2, pp. 141-158

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001218187

Calibration and Bayesian learning

Turdaliev, Nurlan - 1999

"In a repeated game of incomplete information, myopic players form beliefs on next-period play and choose strategies to maximize next-period payoffs. Beliefs are treated as forecast of future plays. Forecast accuracy is assessed using calibration tests, which measure asymptotic accuracy of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001410072

A service of the

zbw