In many settings, behavioral economists have documented a price reference effect: the fact that a consumer …'s willingness to pay for a good is affected by difference between the observed price and the reference price they rationally expect … textbook intuition. In particular, we show that if this price reference effect is sufficiently large, vertical integration …

manufacturers if they collude. We thus provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance when manufacturers collude and …We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with … price level even when manufacturers collude. In this context, resale price maintenance may only be profitable for the …

manufacturers if they collude. We thus provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance when manufacturers collude and …We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with … price level even when manufacturers collude. In this context, resale price maintenance may only be profitable for the …

We provide a novel explanation for why manufacturers want to enforce a minimum resale price (min RPM) on retailers. A … manufacturer sells her good via a multi-product retailer to final consumers by charging a linear wholesale price. The manufacturer … for min RPM critically relies on interbrand competition, and it is-at least in the case of linear demand functions …

We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly … setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a …

We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two … retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding …