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Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2010

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed privatepublic good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003962736

Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - In: European economic review : EER 55 (2011) 5, pp. 678-687

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009243410

Cost sharing in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2014

-sharing selective incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361507

Taxation and incentives to innovate : a principal-agent approach

D'Andria, Diego - 2014

knowledge economy. Corporate taxes and labor income taxes can affect both the firm owner’s and the employee’s incentives to … incentives and reductions in the tax rate levied on profit sharing schemes. This complementarity holds, albeit with different … relative importance for the two tax incentives, also with non-deductible labor costs, with a stochastic innovation value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433907

Motivating innovation in a knowledge economy with tax incentives

D'Andria, Diego; Savin, Ivan - 2015

innovate or not, we propose that this decision is actually taken by their employees (agents). We compare the two tax incentives … tax incentives are found to play a role in fostering innovation. In addition we find important effects on the incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483411