We consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes, exemplified with environmental pollution. When in power, a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view...

Since Montgomery [1972. Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory 5, 395-418] and Weitzman [1974. Prices vs. quantities. Review of Economic Studies 41, 477-491], it has generally been assumed that, in a full-information setting, tradable quotas and...

We suggest a simple framework for characterizing alternative ways that “persuasive advertising” may affect consumer preferences. We illustrate the implications of our theory—and contrast it with results from models of informative advertising—by analyzing the relationship between the...

The European Commission is introducing new regulations on submission and publication of data in electricity markets (SPDEM) and on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (REMIT). I discuss issues relevant for undertaking an evaluation such regulations. I argue that, for market...

We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in...

The use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy. This paper presents an analysis of how, and under what conditions, emission rights can be used...