We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure in a rich-context, unstructured bargaining game with earned status and competing reference points. Our results show that average opening proposals, concessions, and agreed shares are very similar across different levels of time pressure....

We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure in a rich-context, unstructured bargaining game with earned status and competing reference points. Our results show that average opening proposals, concessions, and agreed shares are very similar across different levels of time pressure....

In der Regel wird in der etablierten wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Lehre angenommen, dass der Mensch ein Homo oeconomicus ist: rational handelnd und auf materielle Gewinne ausgerichtet. Aber wird das Verhalten der Menschen durch dieses Bild richtig abgebildet? Handeln sie rational, oder wird das...

An extensive literature has studied ambiguity aversion in economic decision making, and how ambiguity aversion can account for empirically observed violations of expected utility-based theories. Almost all relevant applied models presume a general dislike of ambiguity. In this paper, we provide...