This paper examines distortions in corporate investment decisions when a new project changes firm risk. It presents a dynamic model in which a self-interested, risk-averse manager makes investment decisions at a levered firm. The model, calibrated using data from public firms, is used to...

The benefits of productive investment projects are difficult to ascertain due to the long-term nature of these investments.The risk-taking approaches of these investors are often ignored.This research examines the individual and combined effect of risk aversion and uncertainty on productive...

We develop a dynamic agency model where payout, investment and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout in order to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus...

We provide evidence that growth options play an important role in determining the negative relation between corporate investment and idiosyncratic risk in the absence of agency problem. A simple real options model predicts that the negative relation between corporate investment and idiosyncratic...

We investigate the effect of CEO hedging on the likelihood and characteristics of M&A decisions. Because of their higher degree of risk tolerance, hedged CEOs are more likely to engage in M&As and are more likely to acquire private and smaller targets. M&A deals by hedged CEOs appear to create...

We develop a dynamic agency model where payout, investment and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout in order to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus...