We analyse the wage choice of a monopoly union against entry threat. The wage carries information about market demand, which is crucial to an uninformed entrant, and in addition affects the entrant's post-entry cost through labour market institutions. The union may wish to deter or accommodate...

This paper analyzes Nash equilibria of a sealed offer bargaining game where agents first choose their optimal trading sides before they begin bargaining. In a full-participation Nash equilibrium, the probability of any trader reaching an agreement at the bargaining stage will be higher than that...

This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts where the workers' reservation wage is the relevant information parameter critical for entry. The authors show that entry threat signicantly distorts the wage, which in turn adversely aects the rm's ability to signal...

We study school choice and school efficiency in terms of secondary school completion test scores by utilizing a unique database from Nepal. There are two novel features of our analysis: firstly we allow for heterogeneity among private schools, by distinguishing socially motivated trust-run...

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining...

The recent financial crisis led many governments to buy equity in banks leading to situations of mixed oligopoly in banking markets. We model such a case where a partially state-owned bank competes with a private bank in collecting deposits. The government is purely a welfare maximizer while the...

We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain unchanged. When the...