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Bertrand competition with intertemporal demand

Dutta, Prajit K. (contributor); … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource], This revision February 15, 2005

In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001652352

Clever agents in adaptive learning

Matros, Alexander - In: Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection in games, (pp. 1-25). 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001602246

Evolutionary dynamics on extensive form games with perfect information

Matros, Alexander - In: Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection in games, (pp. 1-27). 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001602253

Elimination cup tournaments with player endowment

Matros, Alexander - In: Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection in games, (pp. 1-7). 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001602254

Clever agents in adaptive learning

Matros, Alexander - 2000

Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce "cleverness" of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...