Citizen–candidate models postulate a politics without political parties. Any citizen may become a candidate for office. A winner is chosen from among the candidates by voting with ties broken by the flip of a coin. All voters have preferences over a set of policies. The winning candidate...

This paper is about a model of uncertainty in voting that allows for a schedule of people`s preferences for one party over another, that gives rise to a chance of casting a pivotal vote which is small but not, as often supposed, infinitesimal, that is not inconsistent with evidence about the...

1) Bargaining Unexplained, page 2 2) Bargaining Assumptions in the Study of Politics, Law and War, page 27 3) Bargaining and Voting, page 49

A common, though by no means universally-accepted doctrine among practitioners of law and economics is that redistribution is no business of the law. This efficiency-only doctrine is not that redistribution is unworthy as a social objective, but that any given benefit to the poor is attainable...

Patents raise the price and reduce consumption of the patented good, but the resulting deadweight loss is thought to be worth bearing when patent protection is required as an incentive to invention. The newly-invented good generates a residual surplus, making people better off than they would be...

The incentive to advertise is a consequence of monopoly power, for there is nothing to gain from advertising by a firm that can sell its entire output at an invariant market price. Advertising is expenditure by a firm to increase the elasticity of demand for its product or to shift the demand...