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Welfare analysis in a Schumpeterian growth model with capital
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Reinthaler, Volker - 2001
In this note we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution in the Howitt and Aghion (1998) model to the social optimum. The analysis offers several new insights in comparison to the welfare analysis in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We find various new distortions between private and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401108
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Welfare Analysis in a Schumpeterian Growth Model with Capital
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Reinthaler, Volker - 2001
In this note we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution in the Howitt and Aghion (1998) model to the social optimum. The analysis offers several new insights in comparison to the welfare analysis in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We find various new distortions between private and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262488
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Welfare Analysis in a Schumpeterian Growth Model with Capital
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Reinthaler, Volker - 2021
In this note we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution in the Howitt and Aghion (1998) model to the social optimum. The analysis offers several new insights in comparison to the welfare analysis in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We find various new distortions between private and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321001
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Welfare Analysis in a Schumpeterian Growth Model with Capital
Kaul, Ashok; Reinthaler, Volker; Hagedorn, Marcus - In: Economics Bulletin 15 (2007) 7, pp. 1-6
In this note we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution in the Howitt and Aghion (1998) model to the social optimum. The analysis offers several new insights in comparison to the welfare analysis in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We find various new distortions between private and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835818
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Welfare Analysis in a Schumpeterian Growth Model with Capital
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Reinthaler, Volker - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2001
In this note we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution in the Howitt and Aghion (1998) model to the social optimum. The analysis offers several new insights in comparison to the welfare analysis in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We find various new distortions between private and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703487
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Welfare Analysis in a Schumpeterian Growth Model with Capital
Kaul, Ashok; Reinthaler, Volker; Hagedorn, Marcus - In: Economics Bulletin 15 (2007) 7, pp. 1-6
In this note we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution in the Howitt and Aghion (1998) model to the social optimum. The analysis offers several new insights in comparison to the welfare analysis in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We find various new distortions between private and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094754
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Fostering within-family human-capital investment : an intragenerational insurance perspective of social security
Barbie, Martin; Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok - In: FinanzArchiv : European journal of public finance 62 (2006) 4, pp. 503-529
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003406105
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An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003512813
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An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 34 (2010) 3, pp. 490-502
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003966485
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An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2002 - First draft: April 2002, This version: December 2002
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519045