We consider lotteries with reimbursements. It turns out that without loss of generality it is enough analyze lotteries where the winner gets her expenses reimbursed. We find that such a lottery (Sad-Loser) has multiple pure-strategy equilibria. We describe all equilibria and discuss their...

This paper analyses an evolutionary version of the Public Good game of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) in which agents can choose between imitation and best-reply decision rules. We describe conditions under which altruistic and spiteful (maximizing) behavior arise: these conditions are...

We consider two-round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. Two approaches are suggested. If the players have the same resources and a success function is stochastic, then players always spend more resources in the first than in the second round in...

We consider two-round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. Two approaches are suggested. If the players have the same resources and a success function is stochastic, then players always spend more resources in the first than in the second round in...

We consider a Blotto game with Incomplete Information. A pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed.