We examine a technology adoption game with network effects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We define a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make...

The decision to adopt e-commerce technology depends on a variety of variables. This paper explores the relative importance of structural firm-specific variables, the intrinsic value of the technology, expectations concerning the evolution of the technology, and the adoption behaviour of other...

We investigate the relationship between market structure and platforms' incentives to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider innovations that...

This paper presents an empirical estimation of catastrophe model of organizational adoptions of a high technology product when network externalities are present. As such, it integrates work from the economics literature and the catastrophe literature to provide a broadeer look at adoption...