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Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria of scalarized games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949973
Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949988
A class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems is defined. These shortest path games are totally balanced and allow a population-monotonic allocation scheme. Possible methods for obtaining core elements are indicated; first, by relating to the allocation rules in taxation and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950128
In this paper we present a generalization of the Shapley-Ichiishi result for convex games to the class of all exact games. Then we discuss two applications to the class of convex games. First we show that it can indeed be used to give an alternative proof of the Shapley-Ichiishi result. Secondly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005304909
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008216198
Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145007
In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of shortest path games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771032
A set of necessary and sufficient conditions for convexity of a transferable utility game in terms of its decomposition into unanimity games is shown to be minimal: none of the conditions is redundant. The result is used to provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value on the set of convex games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419196