Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency

Bayesian experts with a common prior that are exposed to different types of evidence possibly make contradicting probabilistic forecasts. A policy maker who receives the forecasts must aggregate them in the best way possible. This is a challenge whenever the policy maker is not familiar with the...

Consider a setting where many individuals make predictions over the (unknown) state of nature based on signals they receive independently. An outside Bayesian observer, familiar with the common prior shared by the individuals, can aggregate this information and identify correctly the actual...

We analyze repeated games in which players have private information about their levels of patience and in which they would like to maintain the privacy of this information vis-a-vis third parties. We show that privacy protection in the form of shielding players' actions from outside observers is...