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Prequential testing of a forecaster is known to be manipulable if the test must pass an informed forecaster for all possible true distributions. Stewart (2011) provides a non-manipulable prequential likelihood test that only fails an informed forecaster on a small, category I, set of...
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A unified framework is developed for representation of, and reasoning about dynamic games. A game is described by the subjective knowledge of players at hypothetical situations - the epistemic game form. Subjective knowledge - termed confidence - allows us to replace objective reasoning about...
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The subjective framework for reasoning is extended to incorporate the representation of unawareness in games. Both unawareness of actions and decision makers are modeled as well as reasoning about others' unawareness. It is shown that a small grain of uncertainty about unawareness with rational...
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We suggest a test for discovering whether a potential expert is informed of the distribution of a stochastic process. In a non-Bayesian non-parametric setting, the expert is asked to make a prediction which is tested against a single realization of the stochastic process. It is shown that by...
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