This paper considers what kind of managerial compensation contract is optimal for mitigating the moral hazard decision regarding investment timing. We examine the situation where the personal objectives of managers do not align with those of shareholders and where there is the possibility of...

This paper tests a real business cycle model with efficient long-term labor contracts (the efficient long-term contract model) against a standard real business cycle model (the intertemporal substitution model). In the former model, employment and real wages are determined by bilateral dynamic...

This paper develops a model that considers the entrepreneur's moral hazard in the choice of project, the bank's moral hazard in the choice of bank loan contracting and refinancing, and the prudential regulation of the bank. The main findings are as follows: (i)Increasing capital requirements...

We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer to a self-interested arbitrator at the renegotiation stage even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any...