This paper considers the role of stock-based compensation, such as restricted stock grants and stock options, in mitigating the moral hazard problem in teams in which agents who face the possibility of turnover must choose a level of effort or investment within working relationships with the...

This paper considers how a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) designs a bargaining process for the determination of his or her own compensation by selecting the level of independence of board members in order to influence the compensation determination process within the board and the monitoring...

This paper considers whether or not the first-best level of firm-specific human capital investment is attained by the use of stock option plans for workers and the choice of the method of payment for acquisitions even though workers are threatened with the possibility of a divestiture and...

We explore how the timings of compensation payment and contract termination are jointly and optimally determined in a continuous-time principal—agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors (the principal) when the agent has loss—averse preferences. Our theoretical...

In this paper, we adapt a continuous-time agency model to incorporate the loss-aversion preferences of agents. To this end, by distinguishing between the gains in capital and income driven by variations in the agent's continuation payoff, we provide a theoretical model which overcomes the...

We extend Hayes and Schaefer (2009) model to derive testable hypotheses for the existence of the peer-group effect in the CEO labor market. Our model predicts higher growth in relative compensation for CEOs under higher firm-level productivity. The model also predicts increase in peer-group...

This paper considers how firm-specific factors affected the financial relations between banks and firms in Japan during the period in which deregulation and reform of the financing decisions of firms were almost completed. This was also a period in which Japanese banks incurred large bad loans....

In this paper, I explore how the acquisition mode and capital structure of the acquiring firm are determined when there is asymmetric information about the type of manager of the acquiring firm. Under nonbootstrap acquisition, an increase in the leverage ratio reduces the capital cost by...

We explore equilibrium allocation and efficiency when private firms are listed by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC), compared with when they are listed through a traditional initial public offering (IPO). We show that a traditional IPO is more informationally efficient...

This paper explores a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist—entrepreneur relationship where a manager provides unobservable effort while a venture capitalist (VC) both supplies unobservable effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public...