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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003853340
Individuals exhibit a randomization preference if they prefer random mixtures of two bets to each of the involved bets. Such preferences provide the foundation of various models of uncertainty aversion. However, it has to our knowledge not been empirically investigated whether uncertainty-averse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003916450
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008909171
Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous experimental studies. However, all experiments in which bubbles occur pay dividends after each trading day. In this paper we study whether bubbles can occur in markets without dividends. We investigate the role of two features that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592714
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort require- ment? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal- agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592848
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592940
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003593107
We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003578893
What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003539334
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003563344