We analyze the welfare effects of parity rules, prevalent in telecommunications and other regulated industries, that force a vertically-integrated input monopolist to treat its own downstream affiliate and downstream competitors comparably in terms of input price and quality. When input pricing...

This paper compares one-part pricing and two types of two-part pricing in a general discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without unit-price commitment. When unit-price commitment...

This paper examines the tension between competition for the customer and competition in the market in a differentiated-product oligopoly. Consumers make purchases through an exclusive supply relationship that is modeled as a discrete-continuous choice problem. We characterize Bertrand-Nash...

We analyze the welfare effects of “parity” rules that force a vertically-integrated input monopolist (VIM) to treat downstream affiliates and competitors alike in terms of price and quality. We find that input-quality parity can lower social welfare when input pricing is unregulated. In...

We review the different market monitoring and market-power mitigation policies that arise in world electricity markets. Regulators for electricity markets apparently respond to differences in underlying market structure and design features when choosing between ex-ante (that is, rule-based)...