Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferable-utility cooperative game. When the concerned agents are risk averse, there is a core imputation given by means of shadow prices on state-dependent claims. Like in finance, a risk can hardly be evaluated merely by its inherent statistical...

We explore optimal search for individual improvement when agents start with different confidence in their own ability. The initial self-confidence may be determined by nature or socioeconomic factors. Presuming Bayesian learning, we show that final achievements depend positively on initial...

Abstract. This paper considers a fairly large class of noncooperative games in which strategies are jointly constrained. When what is called the Ky Fan or Nikaidô-Isoda function is convex-concave, selected Nash equilibria correspond to diagonal saddle points of that function. This feature is...

This paper studies measurement of welfare e¤ects, transient and permanent, of stabilizing or deregulating prices in Cobweb-like settings. As in Cobweb-models, producers must commit inputs in face of uncertainty. Here, however, we consider producers who are concerned with adaptations of inputs...

Abstract. Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferableutility, cooperative game, featuring risk averse players. Like in competitive equilibrium, a core solution is determined by shadow prices on state-dependent claims. And like in finance, no risk can properly be priced only in terms...

This note looks at insurance of minor, recurrent losses. The main concern is with efficiency properties of full coverage. As motivation and running example we concider a regime, currently operative in several European countries, that offers employees complete wage reimbursement during short...

Focus is here on coalitional games among economic agents plagued by aggregate pollutions of diverse sorts. Defecting players presumably pollute more than others. Then, granted convex preferences and technologies, the core is proven nonempty. In fact, under natural assumptions, a specific,...

Main objects here are normal-form games, featuring uncertainty and noncooperative players who entertain local visions, form local approximations, and hesitate in making large, swift adjustments. For the purpose of reaching Nash equilibrium, or learning such play, we advocate and illustrate an...

Many economic models and optimization problems generate (endogenous) shadow prices - alias dual variables or Lagrange multipliers. Frequently the “slopes” of resulting price curves - that is, multiplier derivatives - are of great interest. These objects relate to the Jacobian of the...

It is common to tolerate that a system's performance be unsustainable during an interim period. To live long however, its state must eventually satisfy various constraints. In this regard we design here differential inclusions that generate, in one generic format, two distinct phases of system...