Financial options typically incorporate times of exercise. Alternatively, they embody set-up costs or indivisibilities. Such features lead to planning problems with integer decision variables. Provided the sample space be finite, it is shown here that integrality constraints can often be...

Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the...

Risk exchange is considered here as a cooperative game with transferable utility. The set-up fits markets for insurance, securities and contingent endowments. When convoluted payoff is concave at the aggregate endowment, there is a price-supported core solution. Under variance aversion the...

Abstract. This paper considers a fairly large class of noncooperative games in which strategies are jointly constrained. When what is called the Ky Fan or Nikaidô-Isoda function is convex-concave, selected Nash equilibria correspond to diagonal saddle points of that function. This feature is...

This paper studies measurement of welfare e¤ects, transient and permanent, of stabilizing or deregulating prices in Cobweb-like settings. As in Cobweb-models, producers must commit inputs in face of uncertainty. Here, however, we consider producers who are concerned with adaptations of inputs...

Abstract. Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferableutility, cooperative game, featuring risk averse players. Like in competitive equilibrium, a core solution is determined by shadow prices on state-dependent claims. And like in finance, no risk can properly be priced only in terms...

Motivated by emission and resource markets, this paper considers repeated, bilateral barters between owners of commodity bundles, contingent claims, or property rights. Focus is on feasible, voluntary exchanges, driven only by differences in substitution rates. No coordination is ever needed....

This note looks at insurance of minor, recurrent losses. The main concern is with efficiency properties of full coverage. As motivation and running example we concider a regime, currently operative in several European countries, that offers employees complete wage reimbursement during short...

Focus is here on coalitional games among economic agents plagued by aggregate pollutions of diverse sorts. Defecting players presumably pollute more than others. Then, granted convex preferences and technologies, the core is proven nonempty. In fact, under natural assumptions, a specific,...

Main objects here are normal-form games, featuring uncertainty and noncooperative players who entertain local visions, form local approximations, and hesitate in making large, swift adjustments. For the purpose of reaching Nash equilibrium, or learning such play, we advocate and illustrate an...