the unverifiability problem of labor contracts. Under a zero-profit condition, both tournament types will yield first … all the bargaining power. However, if workers are rik averse or one worker has a lead a J-type tournament may dominate a U …-type tournament. …

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a …-dependent exit options for agents. In contrast to screening models with perfect competition, we find that existence of equilibria … that the efficiency of variable pay depends on the degree of competition for agents: For small degrees of competition, low …

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a … high degrees of vertical differentiation, i.e. low competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too … little effort. For high degrees of competition, high-ability agents are over-incentivized and bear too much risk. For a range …

This paper examines the effects of promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO executives on corporate innovation …. We find that firms with greater tournament incentives, which are measured as the pay gap between the CEO and other … tournament incentives. The attraction of talent and the reduction in excessive board interventions appear two plausible …

sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following …

sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following …