This chapter discusses the principal theoretical and practical problems of the economics of cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger. Because the new theoretical approaches are not easily modified to encompass welfare considerations, except in a very partial-equilibrium setting, the positive...

Market power and joint dominance are examined in U.K. brewing. I assess unilateral and coordinated effects, where the latter is equated with joint dominance, and show how one can distinguish between the two econometrically. The application makes use of two demand equations: the nested logit of...

We investigate the nature of price competition among firms that produce differentiated products and compete in markets that are limited in extent. We propose an instrumental variables series estimator for the matrix of cross price response coefficients, demonstrate that our estimator is...

We examine theoretical predictions and econometric evidence concerning franchise contracting and sales-force compensation and suggest a number of factors that ought to influence the contracts that are written between principles and agents. For each factor, we construct the simplest theoretical...