A new linear value for cooperative transferable utility games is introduced. The recursive definition of the new value for an n-person game involves a sequential process performed at n−1 stages, applying the value to subgames with a certain size k,1⩽kn, combining with the rule of two-leveled...

The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by...

The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by...

In this note we prove that the kernel of a bilateral assignment game is always included in the core. This solves an outstanding open problem for bilateral assignment games.

A game with a restricted cooperation is a triple consisting of a finite set of players, a collection of feasible coalitions, and a characteristic function. The class of all games with a restricted cooperation with an arbitrary universal set of players is considered.The prenucleolus and the...