Problems of allocating joint costs in a reasonable way arise in many practical situations where people decide to work together to save costs. Cost allocation methods based on game theoretical concepts take into account the strategic aspects of cost allocation situations. We give a survey of cost...

According to the work of Faigle [3] a static Shapley value for games on matroids has been introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1]. In this paper we present a dynamic Shapley value by using a dynamic model which is based on a recursive sequence of static models. In this...

In the classical model of cooperative games, it is considered that each coalition of players can form and cooperate to obtain its worth. However, we can think that in some situations this assumption is not real, that is, all the coalitions are not feasible. This suggests that it is necessary to...

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive...

According to the work of Faigle [3] a static Shapley value for games on matroids has been introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1]. In this paper we present a dynamic Shapley value by using a dynamic model which is based on a recursive sequence of static models. In this...