We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

We study the formation of mutual insurance networks in a model where every agent who obtains more resources gives a fixed amount of resources to all agents who have obtained less resources. The low resource agent must be directly linked to the high resource agent to receive this transfer. We...

This article displays a study of the mutual insurance of bank deposits. A system where deposits are first insured by a consortium then by the Government is envisaged. We wish to compute the fair premia due to both the consortium and the Government. Various types of covenants aiming at making...

The coexistence of mutual and stock organizational form in insurance has been the topic of extensive study. This article provides a review of theoretical and empirical literature from three perspectives: agency problems in each form, efficiency, and the causes of conversion between the two...

We explore the welfare consequences of different taxation schemes in an economy where agents are debt-constrained. If agents default on their debt, they are banned from future intertemporal trade, but retain their private (labor) endowments which are subject to income taxation. We impose...

This paper characterizes the welfare gains from redistributive taxation and social insurance in an environment where the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze stylized models in which adverse selection, pre-existing information, or imperfect optimization in private insurance...