The present paper proposes a myopic, boundedly rational heuristic for individual decision-making in differential game settings. I demonstrate that this type of behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated stage games without a state variable if the stage game is strategically...

Abstract This paper is concerned with methods for analysing patterns of conflict. We survey dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics, giving examples for each type of...

Wir illustrieren den Einsatz von Simulationstechniken zur Betrachtung komplexer Dynamiken in asymmetrischen Konfliktsituationen mit begrenzt rationalen Akteuren. Dazu wird erst ein formaler Modellrahmen entwickelt, dessen Steady state wir bestimmen. Darauf baut eine Umsetzung des Modells in...

The present paper proposes a myopic, boundedly rational heuristic for individual decision-making in differential game settings. I demonstrate that this type of behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated stage games without a state variable if the stage game is strategically...